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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Randall Steven Rothwell appeals from the judgment of conviction entered
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of lewd conduct with a child under 16.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Six-year old AN. and her adoptive mother reside in Hauser, Idaho. (Trial
Tr., Vol. I, p.230, Ls.1-3; p.232, L.5 - p.233. L.1.) Their next-door neighbors
were 18-year-old Randall Rothwell and his parents. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.236, L.12 p.238, LA; Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.398, Ls.24-25; PSI, p.1.)

One evening in April

2009, AN. asked her mother if she could go next door and play with the
Rothwells' dog. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.243, L.20 - p.246, L.6.) AN.'s mother told
AN. she could if she asked permission from an adult at the Rothwells' house.
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.245, L.22 - p.246, L.6.)

AN. got permission from Steve

Rothwell, Randall's father, and entered the Rothwells' yard.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I,

p.246, Ls.6-9;); Steve Rothwell then left the residence, leaving Randall alone at
the house with AN. still playing in the yard. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, pAOO, L.9 - pA03,
L.3.)
After a few minutes, AN's mother looked outside and did not see AN.
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.246, L.15 - p.247, LA.) AN's mother went outside, and called
for AN around the vicinity of the house.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.247, L.5 - p.248,

L.17.) After some amount of time, she saw AN. and Randall walk out of the
back door of the Rothwells' house. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.248, L.18 - p.249, L.2.)
AN.'s mother was upset, and told AN. that she was not supposed to be in
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anyone's house without permission. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.249, Ls.3-6.) Randall told
AN's mother they had been playing video games. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.249, LS.67.) AN. then blurted out, "mommy, Randy had me lick his penis." (Trial Tr., Vol.
I, p.249, Ls.9-23.) Randall commented on AN.'s "imagination," and took AN.
back into his house. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.250, Ls.1-5.) AN.'s mother, initially in
shock, went back to her house before returning to and knocking on the Rothwells'
front door. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.250, Ls.6-14.) There, AN.'s mother retrieved AN.
and took her back to her house. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.250, Ls.6-23.)
Back inside, AN.'s mother discussed the incident with AN. and notified
law enforcement.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.250, L.24 - p.251, L.11.)

Deputy Ellis

responded and spoke with AN.'s mother. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.73, LA - p.74, L.9.)
She requested that AN.'s mother take AN. to the Kootenai Medical Center
("KMC"), for examination. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.74, Ls.13-18.) At KMC, AN. and
her mother met with registered nurse Farrah Arneson.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.60,

L.10 - p.68, L.23.) AN. told Arneson that Randall told her to lick his penis. (Trial
Tr., Vol. I, p.65, Ls.11-16.) Based on this information, Arneson retrieved a sexual
assault evidence collection kit and took swabs of AN.'s face and hands, places
where Arneson had noticed "illuminating areas" under a blue light woods lamp.
(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.65, L.17 - p.68, L.23.)
The swabs, and AN.'s clothing, were sent to the Idaho State Forensic
Services Laboratory for testing.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.92, Ls.2-4; p.106, L.23 -

p.107, L.10.) Forensic scientists located a small amount of sperm cells on the
swab used on AN.'s face, but could not obtain a DNA profile. (Trial Tr., Vol. I,
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p.112, L.13 - p.115, L.17.) No sperm cells or semen was found on the other
swabs or AN.'s clothes. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.126, L.5 - p.130, L.23.)
Officers obtained a warrant of detention and retrieved a DNA sample from
Randall Rothwell. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.82, L.4 - p.87, L.15.) The swabs taken from
AN., and Randall's DNA sample, were then sent to the DNA Diagnostics Center
in Cincinnati.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.140, Ls.1-2; p.150, L.5 - p.154, L.17.)

The

forensic scientists there could not find sperm cells or semen on the swabs, but
were able to obtain a partial DNA profile. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.154, L.20 - p.156,
L.16.) Randall Rothwell's DNA was consistent with the partial DNA profile found
on the swabs. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.155, L.21 - p.157, L.6.) The frequency rate of
an occurrence of a match between two samples with that type of partial profile is
one in 126. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.222, L.18 - p.223, L.17.)
The police arrested Rothwell and the state charged him with one count of
lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under 16. (R., pp.35-36.) At trial, AN.
testified that Rothwell told her to come into his house. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.268,
Ls.20-23.) There, Rothwell told AN. to lick and rub his penis, and told her that
she could play video games at his house afterward. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.269, L.2 p.276, L.3.) Rothwell testified in his own defense and denied any inappropriate
conduct.

(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.398, L.5 - p.456, L.25.) The jury found Rothwell

guilty of lewd and lascivious conduct. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.523, Ls.2-15.)
The district court entered a unified 25-year sentence with six years fixed,
but retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.274-277.)

After three jurisdictional review

hearings held over the next year, the district court relinquished jurisdiction and
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ordered its original sentence executed. (5/17/11 Tr.; 11/17/11 Tr.; 11/30/11 Tr.)
Rothwell timely appealed. (1/5111 Notice of Appeal.)

4

ISSUES
Rothwell states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it prohibited
Mr. Rothwell from presenting the testimony of Nicole and
Devin McConnell, character witnesses for the defense?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion in allowing the State
to introduce a photograph of a lawn chair and question Mr.
Rothwell's mother about the chair because it was not
relevant evidence or was overly prejudicial?

3.

Did the State violate Mr. Rothwell's right to a fair trial by
committing prosecutorial misconduct?

4.

Was Mr. Rothwell's Fourteenth Amendment right to due
process of law violated because the accumulation of errors in
his trial deprived him of his right to a fair trial?

5.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished
jurisdiction over Mr. Rothwell?

6.

Alternatively, did the district court abuse its discretion when it
sentenced Mr. Rothwell to a unified sentence of twenty-five
years, with six year fixed, and when it failed to reduce his
sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction?

(Appellant's brief, p.8)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.

Has Rothwell failed to show the district court abused its discretion in
excluding the testimony of Rothwell's proposed character witnesses?

2.

Has Rothwell failed to show the district court abused its discretion in
concluding evidence about the Rothwell's lawn chair was relevant?

3.

Has Rothwell failed to show the prosecutor mischaracterized the evidence
during his closing argument, or that any such mischaracterization
constitutes fundamental error?

4.

Has Rothwell failed to show the prosecutor committed prosecutorial
misconduct in closing argument by appealing to the passions and
prejudices of the jury?
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5.

Has Rothwell failed to show cumulative error?

6.

Has Rothwell failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it
relinquished jurisdiction?

7.

Has Rothwell failed to show the district court abused its discretion at
sentencing, or when it chose not to sua sponte reduce his sentence after
relinquishing jurisdiction?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Rothwell Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Excluding The Testimony Of Rothwell's Proposed Character Witnesses
A.

Introduction
Rothwell contends the district court abused its discretion in excluding

Rothwell's proposed character witnesses from testifying. (Appellant's brief, pp.915.)

Rothwell's argument fails, however, because the district court properly

exercised its discretion in concluding that the proposed testimony was not
relevant to the elements of lewd conduct, and that any limited probative value of
the evidence was outweighed by the potential for jury confusion.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of

evidence and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only
when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion.

State v. Howard, 135

Idaho 727,721,24 P.3d 44, 48 (2001); State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 112,
106 P.3d 436, 438 (2005).

C.

The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Excluding Rothwell's
Proposed Character Witnesses
Character evidence ordinarily is inadmissible for the purpose of showing

that an individual acted in conformity therewith on any particular occasion. I.R.E.
404(a); State v. Rupp, 118 Idaho 17, 19, 794 P.2d 287, 289 (Ct. App. 1990);
State v. Harvey, 142 Idaho 527, 533, 129 P.3d 1276, 1282 (Ct. App. 2006). A
criminal defendant may, however, offer evidence of a pertinent character trait,
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provided the prosecution is afforded an opportunity to rebut the same.

I.R.E.

404(a)(1); B!:!QQ, 118 Idaho at 19,794 P.2d at 289. For example, one charged
with theft could offer evidence of honesty. State v. Bailey, 117 Idaho 941, 942,
792 P.2d 966, 967 (Ct. App. 1990) (citing State v. Kramp, 200 Mont. 383, 651
P.2d 614, 618 (1982). However, such evidence cannot be admitted unless it is
relevant to the elements of the crime charged.

Bailey, 117 Idaho at 942, 792

P.2d at 967. Evidence is relevant if it increases the likelihood that a fact at issue
did or did not occur. I.R.E. 401. In Bailey, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that
evidence that Bailey only drank alcohol in moderation was not relevant to the
elements of his DUI charge because a person need not drink excessively to be
convicted of DUI, he only needs only to be shown to have consumed alcohol
which perceptibly impaired his ability to drive. Bailey, 117 Idaho at 943, 792 P.2d
at 968.
In this case, Rothwell offered the testimony of Nicole and David
McConnell, who would have testified that, based on their experiences with and
observations of Rothwell, they held the opinion that he was trustworthy around
pre-teen children. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.331, Ls.16-24.) The state objected to the
admission of the testimony. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, p.332, L.5 - p.333, L.1; Trial Tr. Vol.
II, p.362, L.4 - p.363, L.18.)

The district court excluded the testimony,

concluding that trustworthiness with pre-teen children was not a pertinent trait to
the elements of the crime of lewd conduct as charged in this case. (Trial Tr., Vol.
I, p.334, L.3 - p.335, L.10; Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.363, L.21 - p.368, L.8.) The court
reasoned that the proposed witnesses necessarily could only have observed
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Rothwell with children while he was in the witnesses' presence. (Id.) Therefore,
the court concluded, their opinion was not relevant to a crime that was alleged to
have occurred with only the defendant and victim present. (Id.) The court further
concluded that any minimal probative value of the evidence was outweighed by
the likelihood of jury confusion or risk of misleading the jury. (Id.)
The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of
Nicole and David McConnell. A witness's opinion that a defendant is trustworthy
with pre-teen children, necessarily based on observations of him interacting with
pre-teen children while the witness was present, is not a pertinent trait, or
relevant to, the crime of lewd conduct, committed in this instance when the
defendant was alone with a six-year old girl.
In State v. Jackson, 730 P.2d 1361, 1363-1364 (Ct. App. Wash 1986), a
Washington Court of Appeals came to a similar conclusion as the district court
did in this case.

In affirming a trial court's decision to exclude a defendant's

proffered character evidence concerning his sexual morality, the Court in
Jackson cast doubt on whether such evidence could generally be utilized as a
"pertinent trait" in a sex crime case pursuant to Washington Rule of Evidence
404(a)(1).1 The Court reasoned:
The crimes of indecent liberties and incest concern sexual
activity, which is normally an intimate, private affair not known to
the community. One's reputation for sexual activity, or lack thereof,
may have no correlation to one's actual sexual conduct. Simply
put, one's reputation for moral decency is not pertinent to whether
one has committed indecent liberties or incest.

1Washington Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1) is nearly identical to I.R.E. 404(a)(1).
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Jackson, 730 P.2d at 1364. 2
Further, even if the proffered testimony that Rothwell was trustworthy
around pre-teen children had some relevance as a pertinent trait to the crime of
lewd conduct, the district court still had the discretion to exclude the evidence
pursuant to I.R.E. 403 on the basis that its limited probative value was
outweighed by its potential to confuse and mislead the jury. The district court
was expressly and appropriately concerned with the possibility of "mini trials on
collateral issues that distract and confuse the jury." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.364, LS.521.)
Opinion evidence concerning Rothwell's trustworthiness around pre-teen
children was not relevant to the charged crime of lewd conduct. Even if such
evidence had minimal probative value, it was outweighed by the risk of jury
confusion.

Rothwell has therefore failed to show the district court abused its

discretion in excluding his proposed character evidence.

D.

Even If The District Court Erred In Excluding The Testimony. Such Error
Was Harmless
'''Where error concerns evidence omitted at trial, the test [for harmless

error] is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the lack of excluded
evidence might have contributed to the conviction.'"

State v. Harris, 132 Idaho

843, 847, 979 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1999) (quoting State v. Pressnall, 119 Idaho
207, 209, 804 P.2d 936, 938 (Ct. App. 1991)).

The district court properly

exercised its discretion in excluding the testimony of Rothwell's proposed

2 But see State v. Griswold, 911 P.2d 657, 663 (Ct. App. Wash. 2000) (Separate
division of Washington Court of Appeals declining to follow Johnson).
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character witnesses.

However, even if the court erred, the exclusion of the

testimony was harmless because there is no reasonable probability under the
facts of this case that the exclusion contributed to Rothwell's conviction.
For the reasons discussed above, the proposed character testimony had,
at best, minimal relevance to the elements of lewd conduct as charged in this
case. There is no reasonable possibility that the lack of the testimony might have
contributed to the conviction. It is unlikely that in light of AN.'s testimony, which
was supported by forensic evidence and corroborated by AN.'s mother's
observations, and both AN.'s and Rothwell's statements made immediately after
the lewd conduct occurred, that the jury would have been persuaded by
testimony from defense character witnesses who held the opinion that Rothwell,
while in their presence, was trustworthy around pre-teenage children.
Further, if Rothwell had opened the door to the issue of his trustworthiness
around pre-teen children, the state likely would have been permitted to present
evidence of a prior, separate incident reported by AN., during which Rothwell
showed AN. his penis while the two were alone in a garage.

(See Court's

Exhibit 1, pp.16-17; PSI, p.2.) AN. disclosed this incident to the investigating
officer the day after the lewd conduct incident in Rothwell's house.
Exhibit 1, pp.16-17; PSI, p.2.)

(Court's

Such evidence would have mitigated, if not

eliminated, any potential defense value associated with Rothwell's proffered
character witnesses.
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Any error in the exclusion of Rothwell's proposed character witnesses
could not reasonably have affected the outcome of the case and was therefore
harmless. Rothwell has failed to show any basis for reversal.
II.
Rothwell Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In
Concluding Evidence About The Rothwell's Lawn Chair Was Relevant

A.

Introduction
Rothwell contends the district court abused its discretion in admitting

evidence concerning a particular lawn chair the state asserts was positioned to
"send a message" to A.N. and her mother following the lewd conduct incident.
(Appellant's brief, pp.15-19.) Specifically, Rothwell contends that the evidence
was inadmissible because it was irrelevant pursuant to I.R.E. 402, and because
its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. (Id.) Rothwell's argument fails, however, because the evidence was
relevant, and because Rothwell failed to preserve his prejudice claim.

B.

Standard Of Review
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission and exclusion of

evidence and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will be reversed only
when there has been a clear abuse of that discretion. Howard, 135 Idaho at 721,
24 P.3d at48; Robinett, 141 Idaho at 112,106 P.3d at 438.

C.

The District Court Acted With Its Discretion In Admitting The Lawn Chair
Evidence
To be admissible, evidence must be relevant. !.R.E. 401, 402. Evidence

that tends to prove the existence of a fact of consequence in the case, and has
12

any tendency to make the existence of that fact more probable than it would be
without the evidence is relevant. State v. Hocker, 115 Idaho 544,547,768 P.2d
807, 810 (Ct. App. 1989).
Generally, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time
on appeal.

State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1991).

Further, U[a]n objection on one ground will not preserve a separate and different
basis for excluding the evidence." State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878, 885,
119 P.3d at 660, 653 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875, 880,
11 P.3d 494, 499 (Ct. App. 2000).
In this case, the state cross-examined Terri Rothwell, Randall Rothwell's
mother, about the presence of a lawn chair that depicted a smiley face with its
tongue sticking out, that was placed in the Rothwells' yard up against the fence
facing AN.'s yard.

(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.377, L.9 - p.386, L.2; p.396, Ls.5-16;

State's Exhibit 21.)

Terri Rothwell acknowledged ownership of the chair, but

stated that its placement against the fence was not intended to send any
message to AN. and her mother. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.378, LA - p.385, L.18.)
She also testified that the chair was normally only in that particular position, up
against the fence facing AN's house, for two days at a time when it was moved
in order to mow the lawn. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.396, Ls.5-16.) The court granted
the state's motion to admit a photograph of the chair placed against the fence.
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.385, L.21 - p.386, LA.) In rebuttal, AN.'s mother testified that
the chair was up against the fence facing their house for a week sometime after
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the incident, and that the chair was held in position by two other chairs, indicating
a deliberate placement. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.464, L.4 - p.465, L.3.)
Rothwell made various objections during the state's solicitation of this
testimony. Rothwell made several foundatiOn objections during the state's crossexamination of Terri Rothwell regarding the time and dates of the placement of
the chair. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.379, L.8 - p.384, L.6.) Rothwell also objected to
the state's cross-examination questions concerning whether the chair was
intended as a message, on the grounds that such questions were argumentative
and speculative. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.382, L.14 - p.384, L.22.) Most of these
objections were overruled. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.379, L.8 - p.384, L.22.) Rothwell
finally objected to the admission into evidence of the photograph of the chair on
the grounds of "relevancy, and foundation, materiality." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.385,
L.21 - p.386, L.4.)

This objection was overruled and the photograph was

admitted into evidence. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.385, L.25 - p.386, L.4.)
Rothwell did not object to the lawn chair evidence on the ground that its
probative value was outweighed by its unfair prejudice, therefore this argument is
not preserved for appeal. Rothwell did not object to the relevancy of the lawn
chair evidence except as to the admission of the photograph, thus, Rothwell's
relevancy claim is only preserved as to the photograph.
The photograph of the lawn chair was relevant in that it illustrated
evidence already introduced (i.e., Rothwell's mother's testimony about the chair).
In the event that this Court considers the relevance of the entirety of the lawn
chair testimony elicited from Teri Rothwell despite Rothwell's failure to object to
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the testimony on this basis, this evidence was relevant as well. The lawn chair
evidence was relevant to show that Randall Rothwell and his parents were aware
of the allegations against him prior to the execution of the detention warrant and
Rothwell's subsequent arrest and charge. As Rothwell acknowledges on appeal,
the evidence "attempts to show that Mr. Rothwell's family believed that Mr.
Rothwell had committed the alleged acts and were trying to harass the alleged
victim about the conduct." (Appellant's brief, p.18.) Rothwell has therefore failed
to show that the district court abused its discretion in admitting it.

D.

Even If The District Court Erred In Admitting The Lawn Chair Evidence,
Such Error Was Harmless
Idaho Criminal Rule 52 provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or

variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." I.C.R. 52.
"The [harmless error] inquiry is whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, a rational
jury would have convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the
challenged evidence." State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664,669,227 P.3d 918, 923
(2010) (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967); Neder v. United
States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999)); see also State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245
P.3d 961,979 (2010).
If the district court admitted the lawn chair evidence in error, such error
was harmless. In a trial with testimony from the victim who described the crime,
and whose account was supported by forensic evidence, evidence regarding a
lawn chair alleged to be placed in a certain manner as to "send a message" to
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the victim, while relevant, is of admittedly limited probative value and importance,
and of similarly limited prejudicial value.
Further, even if the lawn chair evidence was excluded, the state properly
elicited other evidence, later in the trial, to show the Rothwell family's attempted
intimidation of A N. and her mother. Rothwell testified that he was unaware of
the allegations against him until several months after the incident, and that he
never heard AN. tell her mother that he made her lick his penis. (Trial Tr., Vol.
II, p.421 , L.22 - p.423, L.14; p.451 , L.25 - p.453, L.5.)
In response, the state cross-examined Rothwell about an incident the day
after the lewd conduct incident where Rothwell and his father went to AN.'s
house to confront AN. and her mother. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.467, L.18 - p.472,
L.25.) Rothwell admitted that during that incident, he told AN.'s mother that he
would never hurt AN. (ld.) He also admitted he had to drag his father back to
his house after his father repeatedly beat and kicked on the door of AN.'s
residence. (ld.) The state also re-called AN.'s mother as a rebuttal witness to
discuss this incident. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.460, L.24 - p.464, L.3.)
Even without the lawn chair evidence, the jury would have learned of the
flaws in Randall's assertion that he was unaware of the allegations against him,
and even without the lawn chair evidence, the jury would have been aware that
Rothwell and his father attempted to confront AN. and her mother about the
incident.

By comparison, the lawn chair evidence was of a much lower

prejudicial character.

Any error in admitting the lawn chair evidence was

therefore harmless
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III.
Rothwell Has Failed To Show The Prosecutor Mischaracterized The Evidence
During His Closing Argument, Or That Any Such Mischaracterization Constitutes
Fundamental Error
A.

Introduction
Rothwell contends, for the first time on appeal, that the prosecutor

mischaracterized the evidence on three occasions during his closing argument.
(Appellant's brief, pp.24-29.)

A review of the full context surrounding these

comments, however, reveal that the prosecutor's arguments were proper.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved

for appeal through an objection at triaL" State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245
P.3d 961,976 (2010) (citations omitted). Where a claim is raised for the first time
on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged qualifies as
fundamental error.

C.

kL 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.

The Prosecutor Did Not Mischaracterize The Evidence During Closing
Argument
A closing argument may not misrepresent or mischaracterize the

evidence, unduly emphasize irrelevant facts introduced at trial, refer to facts not
in evidence, argue as substantive evidence matters admitted for limited
evidentiary purposes, or misrepresent the law or the reasonable doubt burden.
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86-87, 156 P.3d 583, 587-88 (Ct. App. 2007).
However, it is well settled that both sides have traditionally been afforded
considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss
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fully, from their respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be
drawn therefrom. See State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969
(2003); Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587.
Unobjected to claims of constitutional error are reviewed using a threepart test:
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant's SUbstantial rights meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.
Application of the foregoing standard to Rothwell's three claims of
unpreserved error demonstrates he has failed to meet his burden of establishing
he is entitled to reversal of his conviction.

1.

The Shotgun Bolts

At trial, Rothwell testified that while AN. did, in fact, come into his house
and into his bedroom, he spent most of the time she was there in the bathroom.
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, pA04, L.5 - pA06, L.20.) On cross-examination, the prosecutor
challenged Rothwell's story. The prosecutor asked Rothwell why he did not just
go next door to tell AN.'s mother where she was, instead of leaving her alone for
15 to 20 minutes in a room with guns and other personal belongings. (Trial Tr.,
Vol. II, pA13, L.23 - pA31, L.18.) Rothwell responded that he trusted AN., and
that the bolts were out of every one of the guns in his room. (Id.) The prosecutor
18

then impeached Rothwell with a video that had previously been introduced into
evidence by Rothwell. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.371, L.5 - p.377, L.3; p.449, L.13 p.451 , L.13.) The video showed the layout of the Rothwells' house, and showed
bolts in the guns in Rothwell's room. (ld.) Just prior to the prosecutor showing
the video, Rothwell conceded he was only "fairly sure" he had taken the bolts out
of the gun at the time AN. was there. (Trial Tr., p.449, Ls.17-20.)
At the start of his closing argument, the prosecutor referenced Rothwell's
version of events, that he had left AN. alone in his bedroom for 15 to 20 minutes
while he used the bathroom, and added, "[n]ow, the defendant came back after
he was in the bathroom and after he left this little girl alone unattended in a room
full of his guns that have their bolts in them, full of his private stuff, a little girl that
he couldn't trust out in the yard with his dog but, nonetheless, he left her alone in
his room." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.485, Ls.19-24.)
Rothwell contends for the first time on appeal that "[t]his information is
directly contrary to the evidence offered," because "Mr. Rothwell testified
specifically that on the date in question, when AN. was in his room, '[t]he bolts
were out of the guns. '" (Appellant's brief, p.25.) Rothwell cannot meet any of the
three prongs of the Perry fundamental error test with regard to this claim of
prosecutorial misconduct.
First, Rothwell cannot show constitutional error. Though it was Rothwell's
testimony that he "normally" takes the bolts of the guns and that he was "fairly
sure" he did so in this instance (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.449, Ls.15-20; p.450, L.25 p.451 , L.1), the prosecutor effectively cross-examined Rothwell on this issue and

19

raised questions as to whether Rothwell's story was accurate.

At closing

argument, the prosecutor was not required to assume Rothwell's version of
events, but was entitled to make contrary inferences based on the evidence.
The prosecutor did not state that Rothwell admitted leaving the bolts in the gun,
but instead merely cast doubt on that version of events.

The prosecutor's

comments were proper, and Rothwell has thus failed to show constitutional error.
Second, even assuming the comments were improper, Rothwell cannot
show that his counsel's decision not to object to the comments wa$ not tactical.
For example, Rothwell's counsel may have chosen to avoid drawing further
attention to the prosecutor's effective cross-examination involving Rothwell's
claimed reasons for his willingness to leave a six-year old girl alone in his room
for 15 to 20 minutes. Rothwell is not entitled to a presumption that his counsel's
decision was not tactical particularly where, as here, there is a reasonable basis
for not objecting.
Finally, even if Rothwell can satisfy the first two prongs of Perry, any such
error was harmless. Rothwell cannot show that the jury would have acquitted
him if not for the prosecutor's comments at closing argument concerning the
guns and bolts. The presence of guns in Rothwell's room was not an overly
significant piece of evidence in the case, but instead merely served to poke
additional holes in Rothwell's testimony.
Because he has failed to satisfy each of the three prongs of the Perry
fundamental error test, Rothwell has failed to show that his conviction should be
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vacated based on the prosecutor's discussion of the evidence regarding the guns
in Rothwell's room.

2.

The Alternative Explanation For The Sperm Cells Found On AN.'s
Cheek

One of the more critical pieces of evidence introduced at trial was the
Idaho State Forensic Services Laboratory's discovery of sperm cells on AN.'s
face.

(See Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.112, L.13 - p.115, L.17.)

At trial, Rothwell

attempted to raise possible explanations for the presence of those sperm cells
other than Rothwell's lewd conduct.

Rothwell questioned each of the state's

medical witnesses about the possibility of material, including sperm cells,
transferring indirectly from one person to another through other objects, such as
a carpet or discarded tissue paper, or through the air. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.69, L.15
- p.70, L.8; p.119, L.21 - p.121, L.16; p.161, L.15 - p.162, L.7; p.218, L.8p.220, L.21.) Rothwell testified that he masturbated in his room on the days prior
to AN. being there.

(Trial Tr., Vol. II, pA45, L.20 - pA46, L.9.)

The clear

inference of this testimony was that AN. may have picked up the sperm cells in
Rothwell's room from a direct source other than him. Rothwell further developed
this inference during his closing argument.

(Trial Tr., Vol. II, pA95, LsA-10;

pA99, L.7 - p.500, L.9.)
On cross-examination the prosecutor asked detailed questions to test the
plausibility of the inference.

The prosecutor asked where in the in the room

Rothwell masturbated, what dates he did so, whether he used tissues, and
whether Rothwell believed AN. may have rubbed the sperm cells on her own
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face after touching something in Rothwell's room. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.446, L.14 p.449, L.12.)
In his closing argument, the prosecutor further discussed tDe defense's
inferred alternative explanation for the sperm cells:
[T]hen [Rothwell] went to the bathroom, and while he was in the
bathroom this little six-year-old girl started rooting around in his
bedroom. She apparently put her hand into his wastebasket. She
touched some of his old tissues that he had some semen on from a
couple days ago, and then this little girl touched her face after she'd
touched his two-day-old semen and got some of his semen on his
face - on her face.
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.485, Ls.11-18.)
Rothwell contends, for the first time on appeal, that these comments
"framed the information about tissues and semen in a way to portray to the jury
that this was Mr. Rothwell's explanation of events," and that this was improper
because Rothwell never asserted that this was what actually occurred, but only
testified that he "supposed" that A.N. could have acquired the sperm cells
indirectly from a source in Rothwell's room.

(Appellant's brief, pp.25-26.)

Rothwell cannot meet any of the three prongs of the Perry test with regard to this
allegation and thus cannot show fundamental error.
First, Rothwell cannot show constitutional error in these comments. The
prosecutor did not mischaracterize the evidence. The defense clearly tried to put
forth the possibility that indirect contact as the result of Rothwell's masturbation
was a possible alternative explanation for the sperm cells found on A.N.'s face.
The fact that the defense raised this alternative explanation as a possibility rather
than as a definitive event did not preclude the prosecution from attacking the
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inference either on cross-examination or in closing argument. The prosecutor
never stated that Rothwell had affirmatively testified about how the sperm cells
got on A.N.'s face. The prosecutor's strategy in this portion of the oral argument
was clear.

He attempted to present all of the defense's various inferred

alternative explanations for the incriminating evidence into a single narrative, and
then tried to cast doubt on the narrative as a whole. This was proper argument.
Second, even if the comments were improper, Rothwell cannot show that
his counsel's decision not to object to the comments was not tactical. Rothwell's
counsel may have chosen to avoid drawing further attention to the implausibility
of the various alternative explanations for the incriminating evidence and the
prosecutor's attacks on them, or counsel may have concluded the argument was
proper based on the evidence presented that he, too, wanted to discuss in
closing argument. Either way, this Court cannot conclude, based on the record,
that's counsel's failure to object was not tactical.
Finally, even if the comments were improper, any such error was
harmless. Rothwell cannot show that the jury would have acquitted him if the
prosecutor had not utilized this particular strategy to discredit Rothwell's
alternative explanation for the incriminating evidence during closing argument.
Because he has failed to satisfy each of the three prongs of the Perry
fundamental error test, Rothwell has failed to show that his conviction should be
vacated.
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3.

The Corroborating Witnesses

Near the

end

of his

rebuttal

closing

argument,

the

prosecutor

acknowledged that if all the state had presented as evidence was AN. 's
testimony, then the state would not have been able to prove the case beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.510, Ls.10-15.) However, the prosecutor
continued:
The bottom line here is that what this little girl said happened
happened, and its backed up or corroborated, if you will, by the
testimony of other people, by her mom, by the nurse, by Detective
Oyler, by her prior testimony at the preliminary hearing. The next
level that it's backed up by is the fact that there's semen on her
face. The next level backing up her testimony, the final level is the
fact that the profile that was found in the swabs that were taken
from her face is consistent with the defendant.
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.510, L.21 - p.511, L.5.)
Rothwell contends, for the first time on appeal, that the prosecutor
mischaracterized the evidence by referring to the "corroborating" of AN.'s
testimony because other witnesses' testimony concerning what AN. said to them
was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. (Appellant's brief, pp.26-27.)
Rothwell cannot meet any of the three prongs of the Perry fundamental error test
with regard to this claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
Rothwell has failed to show constitutional error. On appeal, in focusing
only on statements AN. made to other witnesses, and those witnesses'
testimony about those statements, Rothwell takes a narrow and limited view of
the prosecutor's comments about corroboration.

At trial, the state sought to

prove that AN.'s version of events, as she testified at trial - that Rothwell
committed lewd conduct with her in his bedroom - was true. Every other piece of

24

evidence offered at the trial by the state was intended to, in some way, "back up
or corroborate" AN.'s version of what happened in Rothwell's bedroom. Each
state witness, and each piece of evidence, was presented to "back up or
corroborate" the fact of the occurrence of the lewd conduct.
AN.'s mother corroborated the fact that AN. was in Rothwell's house
alone with Rothwell, and testified that that incident and AN.'s statements to her
compelled her to call the police and to visit the KMC. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.243, L.20
- p.252, L.5.) The medical witnesses corroborated AN.'s version of events with
testimony describing their examinations and testing which ultimately revealed the
presence of sperm cells on AN.'s face and a partial DNA profile consistent with
Randal Rothwell. (Trial Tr., Vol. I, p.60, L.10 - p.68, L.23; p.106, L.23 - p.130,
L.23; p.150, L.5 - p.157, L.6; p.222, L.18 - p.223, L.17.)

Prior consistent

statements AN. made to other witnesses, and during the preliminary hearing,
served to enhance AN.'s credibility. (Trial. Tr., Vol. I, p.289, L.17 - p.294, L.4;
p.297, L.23 - p.312, L.21.)

All of this evidence, as the prosecutor argued,

"backed up or corroborated" AN.'s account of what happened in Rothwell's
bedroom.

This Court should not lightly infer constitutional error based on

Rothwell's

narrow

interpretation

of the

prosecutor's

use

of the

term

"corroborated. "
Second, even if the prosecutor's comments were improper, Rothwell
cannot show that his counsel's decision not to object to the comments was not
tactical. Rothwell's counsel may have wished to avoid drawing attention to the
corroborating evidence, or the concept of corroboration in general. Also relevant
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to prong two is the principle that "a court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor
intends an ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a jury,
sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from the plethora of
less damaging interpretations." Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 647
(1974); see also State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 719, 215 P.3d 414, 439
(2009) (quoting Donnelly).
Finally, even if Rothwell can satisfy the first two prongs of Perry, any error
was harmless. Rothwell cannot show that the jury would have acquitted him if
the prosecutor had simply summarized the state's evidence supporting A.N.'s
version of events in a different manner.
Because he has failed to satisfy each of the three prongs of the Perry
fundamental error test with regard to any of his claims that the prosecutor
mischaracterized the evidence during closing argument, Rothwell has failed to
show that his conviction should be vacated.

IV.
Rothwell Has Failed To Show The Prosecutor Committed Prosecutorial
Misconduct In Closing Argument By Appealing To The Passions And Prejudices
Of The JUry
A.

Introduction
Rothwell contends the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct by

improperly appealing to the passions and prejudices of the jury during his rebuttal
closing argument.

(Appellant's brief, pp.22-24.)

However, a review of the

context reveals that the prosecutor's comments were proper.
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B.

Standard Of Review
When an objection to alleged prosecutorial misconduct is raised at trial,

the appellate court applies a two-part test to determine whetner the misconduct
requires reversal. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 716, 215 P.3d 414, 436
(2009) (citations omitted).

First, the Court "ask[s] whether the prosecutor's

challenged action was improper."

lsi

"If it was not, then there was no

prosecutorial misconduct." Id. "If the conduct was improper," the Court "then
consider[s] whether the misconduct prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair trial
or whether it was harmless."

lsi (quotations and

carries the burden of proving prejudice."

lsi

citation omitted). "The defendant

"When a defendant is unable to

demonstrate prejudice, the misconduct will be regarded as harmless error." lsi

C.

The Prosecutor Did Not Improperly Appeal To The Passions And
Prejudices Of The JUry In His Closing Argument
Appeals to emotion, passion, or prejudice of the jury through the use of

inflammatory tactics are impermissible.
588.

Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87, 156 P.3d at

However, The Idaho Supreme Court has reiterated the importance of

reviewing closing arguments in light of their improvisational nature, noting that "in
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court] must keep
in mind the realities of triaL" State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273,
285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423,427-28,725 P.2d 128, 132-33
(1986)). The Idaho Supreme Court has further recognized "[t]he right to due
process does not guarantee a defendant an error-free trial but a fair one," and
the function of appellate review is "not to discipline the prosecutor for
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misconduct, but to ensure that any such misconduct did not interfere with the
defendant's right to a fair trial." State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,451, 816 P.2d
1002, 1008 (Ct. App. 1991).
In this case, the following exchange took place at the conclusion of the
state's rebuttal closing argument:
[PROSECUTOR:] Now, sometimes situations arise where
even though a case is proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt the jury decides, well, we're gonna acquit this person
despite the case having been proved. Sometimes they do
that because that person might be young. This is not a
situation where that should happen for three reasons. The
first reason is because you took an oath to apply the law to
the evidence, to not let sympathy interfere with your
decision-making. He might be a young man, but, again, the
oath that you took says that you have to follow the law, and
you've got to apply it to the evidence in this case.
The second reason why you shouldn't do it is because it's up
to the Court to decide what to do with him when you find him
guilty. You have a jury instruction that tells you're your not to
basically consider penalty or punishment.
The last reason why you shouldn't acquit this man even
though the evidence proves him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt is because of the crime itself. This isn't some[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Excuse me, Your Honor.
apologize for interrupting. I just wanted to reiterate or make
it clear that this is not an appeal to the passion or prejudice,
trying to emote rather than argue. Thank you.
[THE COURT:] Well [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] He was getting into this is the type
of crime and so forth.
[THE COURT:] I understand, and just caution counsel on the
third point. The objection's noted.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Thank you.
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[THE COURT:] To the extent it's understood, it's overruled.
Go ahead, Mr. Verharen.
[PROSECUTOR:] You know what happened in this case.
He doesn't deserve to be set free. Thank you.
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.511, L.6 - p.512, L.15.)
Rothwell's claim that this portion of the prosecutor's closing argument
improperly appealed to the passions and emotions of the jury fails for two
reasons. First, the prosecutor's comments, and intended line of argument, were
proper. The prosecutor was not attempting to persuade the jury to find Rothwell
guilty for reasons outside the evidence presented at trial, he was attempting to
persuade the jury not to acquit Rothwell for reasons outside the evidence
presented at trial.

The prosecutor asserted that the state proved the case

beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the jury should not make its decision based
on outside factors such as age, because they had taken an oath to follow the law.
Similarly, it appears, if not for Rothwell's objection, the prosecutor would have
continued that the jury should also reach its decision on the evidence, as
opposed to some outside factor, in light of the seriousness of the charge. These
comments would not have been improper.
Second, even if the prosecutor was going to argue that in light of the
seriousness of the crime, the jury should reach its decision on the evidence, as
opposed to some outside factor, and even if such argument would have been
improper, he never actually made such an argument because of Rothwell's
objection.

In objecting to the comments, Rothwell took the opportunity to

"reiterate or make it clear that [the prosecutor's argument] is not an appeal to
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passion or prejudice."

(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.512, Ls.2-5.)

The district court

overruled the objection, but "cautioned" the prosecutor, who immediately
abandoned the argument. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.512, Ls.9-15.) Thus, not only did
the prosecutor say nothing improper, but Rothwell managed to subvert most of
the argument he contends was improper, through his objection.
Rothwell also contends that the prosecutor's final comment during closing
argument, that Rothwell "doesn't deserve to be set free" constituted prosecutorial
misconduct. (Appellant's brief, p.24.) Rothwell did not object to this comment,
and therefore, the three-prong fundamental error test of Perry applies. Rothwell
cannot meet any of the three prongs of Perry and thus cannot show fundamental
error.

The prosecutor's comment, tacked on to the end of his argument after

Rothwell's overruled objection interrupted his planned line of argument, was
proper.

The prosecutor was not arguing that Rothwell "deserved" punishment

due to any general characteristics, or prior bad acts. Instead, he suggested that
Rothwell "deserved" a conviction because he committed the crime charged in this
case. Thus, Rothwell cannot show constitutional error.
Further, even if the comment was improper, Rothwell cannot show that his
counsel's decision not to object was not tactical. Rothwell's counsel had certainly
shown a willingness to object to comments he found improper. With his previous
objection, Rothwell's counsel had already achieved his desired result - he
successfully encouraged the prosecutor to abandon his intended line of
argument.

Further objection may have only served to give the prosecutor an

opportunity to revisit the argument.
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Finally, even if the prosecutor's comment was improper, any error was
clearly harmless. The jury had just been cautioned by Rothwell's counsel and by
the judge not to allow themselves to be influenced by passion or prejudice.
Rothwell cannot show that if not for this singular comment at the conclusion of
the prosecutor's rebuttal argument, the jury would have acquitted him.
The prosecutor did not improperly appeal to the passions and prejudices
of the jury.

Rothwell has thus failed to show that the prosecutor committed

misconduct necessitating vacating his conviction.

V.
Rothwell Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error

"The cumulative error doctrine requires reversal of a conviction when there
is 'an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself might be harmless,
but when aggregated, the errors show the absence of a fair trial, in contravention
of the defendant's constitutional right to due process." State v. Draper, 151 Idaho
576, 594, 261 P.3d 853, 871 (2011) (citations, quotations and alteration omitted).
A necessary predicate to application of the cumulative error doctrine is a finding
of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App.
1998).

In addition, cumulative error analysis does not include errors neither

objected to nor found fundamental. Perry, 150 Idaho at 230, 245 P.3d at 982
Rothwell has failed to show any error, much less two or more objected to
or fundamental errors. Thus, the doctrine of cumulative error does not apply in
this case.

See,~,

LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433

(Ct. App. 1997).
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VI.
Rothwell Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It
Relinquished Jurisdiction Over Him
A.

Introduction
Rothwell contends the district court abused its discretion when it

relinquished jurisdiction following his period of retained jurisdiction. (Appellant's
brief, pp.33-39.) A review of the record supports the district court's determination
that Rothwell was not an appropriate candidate for probation following the period
of retained jurisdiction.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether to grant probation "is a matter left to the sound discretion of the

court." I.C. § 19-2601(4). The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is also a matter
of discretion. See State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711,712,639 P.2d 9, 10 (1981);
State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 1990). A
court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse of
discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate. State v. Chapel, 107
Idaho 193,194,687 P.2d 583,584 (Ct. App. 1984).
"While a recommendation from corrections officials who supervised the
defendant [during the period of retained jurisdiction] may influence a court's
decision, it is purely advisory and is in no way binding upon the court." State v.
Hurst, 151 Idaho 430, 438, 258 P.3d 950, 958 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v.
Merwin, 131 Idaho 642,648,962 P.2d 1026, 1032 (1998); State v. Landreth, 118
Idaho 613, 615, 798 P.2d 458, 460 (Ct. App. 1990)).
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Likewise, an offender's

"[g]ood performance while on retained jurisdiction, though commendable, does
not alone establish an abuse of discretion in the district judge's decision not to
grant probation."

Hurst, 151 Idaho at 438, 258 P.3d at 958 (citing State v.

Statton, 136 Idaho 135,137,30 P.3d 290, 292 (2001)).

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Relinquishing
Jurisdiction
The origin of the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction and

execute its originally imposed sentence in this case came from the sentencing
factors in front of the court during its initial sentencing decision. It is apparent
from the record that in light of the severity of the crime, the impact of the crime on
the victim and her mother, and Rothwell's failure to take responsibility for the
crime at the time of sentencing, Rothwell would need an exemplary performance
during the retained jurisdiction program in order for the court to place him on
probation after only one year in prison.
The facts of the case warranted a harsh sentence.

Rothwell compelled

AN., a six-year old girl, to engage in oral sex and manual-genital contact. (Trial
Tr., Vol. I, p.269, L.2 - p.276, L.3.)

For Rothwell, this was not a singular

opportunistic incident. Rothwell and AN. knew each other and had interacted.
At trial, Rothwell acknowledged he was kind to AN., paid attention to her, and
built the relationship to a point where AN. trusted him. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, p.454,
Ls.3-18.)

During the investigation of the present case, AN. disclosed to a

Kootenai County detective that about 7-8 months prior to the instant offense,
Rothwell exposed his penis to her while they were alone in a garage. (PSI, p.2.)
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The impact of the crime on the victim and her mother was profound.
AN.'s mother reported that following the incident, AN.'s behavior changed.
(PSI, p.5, attachments pp.10-12.) AN. began wetting the bed and refusing to
sleep in her own room.

(PSI, p.5, attachments pp.10-12.) AN. began having

nightmares, from which she woke up screaming. (PSI, p.5, attachments pp.1012.) She also began acting out in an aggressive manner towards boys at school.
(PSI, p.5, attachments pp.1 0-12.) The incident also impacted AN.'s mother's job
performance and emotional well-being. (PSI, p.5, attachments pp.1 0-12.)
While Rothwell does not have a significant criminal history, he was, at the
time he committed the instant offense, on unsupervised juvenile probation for
possession of drug paraphernalia, resisting and obstructing officers, and assault
or battery

~pon

a law enforcement officer. (PSI, pp.6-7.)

Rothwell did not initially take responsibility for his crime. As the district
court informed him at the sentencing hearing, "[a]1I you said in your right of
allocution is that you were sorry that your victim had to have this experience."
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, pp.570, L.22 -p.571, L.6.)
Facing a likely uphill climb in order to be placed on probation, Rothwell's
performance in the retained jurisdiction program was still unsatisfactory. Prior to
the first six-month jurisdictional review hearing, he received six verbal warnings,
three written warnings, and two infractions for various violations of inmate rules.
(5/9/11 APSI, pp.1-2.) Prison staff listening to one of Rothwell's inmate phone

calls heard Rothwell tell his mother that he would kill the warden if his mother
was not approved as a visitor.

(5/9/11 APSI, p.2.)
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A new sex offender risk

assessment recommended that due to the young age of the victim, "[u]ntil it is
ruled out that [Rothwell] is a pedophile, he should be considered a high risk to
reoffend and [be] supervised at that leveL"
Offender Risk Assessment, p.3.)

(5/10/11 APSI, attached Sex

However, after Rothwell demonstrated

amenability for treatment, completed assigned programs, and, in the last few
weeks before the first jurisdictional review hearing, began to develop insight into
his

offending

behavior,

the

Idaho

Department

of Corrections

("IDOC")

recommended Rothwell be placed on probation. (5/10/11 APSI, pp.1-5.)
The district court, while recognizing the progress Rothwell had made, cited
his sex offender risk assessment and overall unsatisfactory performance in
declining to place him on probation. (5/17/11 Tr., p.99, L.14 - p.1 01, L.7.) The
court instead scheduled an additional jurisdictional review hearing in six months.
(ld.)
The second half of Rothwell's period of retained jurisdiction contained
similar disciplinary issues. Rothwell received six verbal warnings, three written
warnings, and one infraction for various violations of inmate rules.

(10/17/11

APSI, pp.2-3.) The IDOC's summary of Rothwell's disciplinary sanctions stated
that he was an "extremely immature young man" who "does not see beyond his
own needs." (10/17/11 APSI, p.3.) Another new sex offender risk assessment
noted that Rothwell's score on the STATIC-99R placed him in the moderate-high
risk to reoffend. (10/17/11 APSI, attached Sex Offender Risk Assessment, pp.23.) The evaluator again recommended Rothwell be considered a high risk to
reoffend until it could be ruled out it he was a pedophile.
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(~,

p.1.) Still, the

IDOC again recommended Rothwell be placed on probation.

(10/17/11 APSI,

pp.1-6.)
The district court again declined to place Rothwell on probation, and
instead relinquished jurisdiction and imposed the original sentence.

(See

generally 11/17/11 Tr; 11/30/11 Tr.) The court referenced Rothwell's "childish"
conduct in the retained jurisdiction program, problematic sex offender risk
assessment, and expressed its pessimism that Rothwell could be successful on
probation. (11/30/11 Tr., p.142, L.1-p.145, L.16.)
The district court considered all of the relevant information and determined
that it would simply be inappropriate to place Rothwell on probation following the
period of retained jurisdiction. Given any reasonable view of the facts, Rothwell
has failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to
relinquish jurisdiction.

VII.
Rothwell Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion At Sentencing,
And When It Chose Not To Sua Sponte Reduce His Sentence After
Relinquishing Jurisdiction

A.

Introduction
Rothwell finally contends that even if the district court did not abuse its

direction by failing to place him on probation following the period of retained
jurisdiction, it abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence initially,
and not sua sponte reducing that sentence after relinquishing jurisdiction.
(Appellant's brief, pp.39-41.) Rothwell's arguments do not establish an abuse of
discretion.
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B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397,401 (2007).

C.

The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of sentencing discretion,

the appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the
sentence is excessive. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. To establish
that the sentence is excessive, Rothwell must demonstrate that reasonable
minds could not conclude the sentence is appropriate to accomplish the
sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution .

.!sL.

Idaho appellate courts presume that the fixed portion of a sentence will be

the defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888,
980 P.2d 552 (1999).
Upon relinquishing jurisdiction, the district court may, pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 35, reduce an underlying sentence sua sponte. I.C.R. 35. A court's
decision not to reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject
to the well-established standards governing whether a sentence is excessive.
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009); State v.
Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 978, 783 P.2d 315, 317 (Ct. App. 1989)).
For the reasons discussed above, including the nature of the crime and its
impact on the victim and her family, the district court did not abuse its discretion
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in imposing a unified 25-year sentence with six years fixed, or in declining to sua
sponte reduce this sentence upon relinquishing jurisdiction.

While Rothwell

appeared to make some progress during the period of retained jurisdiction, the
district court was not required to reduce his sentence upon relinquishing
jurisdiction, particularly given the nature of the offense and Rothwell's risk
assessment results.

Rothwell has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating

that, under any reasonable view of the facts, his sentence of six years fixed
followed by 19 years indeterminate for lewd conduct is excessive, either as
originally imposed, or following the period of retained jurisdiction.

This Court

should thus affirm the district court's sentence.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Rothwell's conviction
and sentence for lewd and lascivious conduct with a child under 16.
DATED this 10th day of July 2012

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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